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I- INTRODUCTION
Early warning Information provides decision makers with
a description of enemy forces as they prepare for, or actu-
ally initiate, an attack. Given early warning, decision
makers in the military and the government, including the
President, can more adequately decide on a response during a
crisis. When policy makers discuss changes to the regula-
tions pertaining to the early warning system, they need to
realize the implications of such policy changes on the
system. This thesis presents the current early warning
system, discusses proposed launch policies, and explores the
possible results from implementing these policies.
Warning information is essential for the survival of the
many parts of our arsenal and its related control systems.
For example, the bomber force depends on timely early
warning so that it may scramble from ground alert to
airborne stations where it is less vulnerable to nuclear
attack. But the use of warning to save the bomber force, or
any other weapon system, addresses only a narrow aspect of
warning. The most important aspect of early warning is to
give advance warning of an enemy's attack, so that the deci-
sion maker has a chance to give the appropriate response to
an attack. Both the United States and the Soviet Union
continue to build systems of extreme complexity for early
warning. Intelligence systems have merged with warning
systems, yielding one overall system which is integrated
vertically with military forces.
Future strategic technology is likely to make nuclear
war more thinkable, especially as nuclear weapons spread to
unstable countries less inclined to respect the nuclear
threshold. The problem of nuclear weapons proliferation
concerns a large number of governments and is intimately
related to the basic energy needs of both the developed and
developing nations. It has fast become an issue of high
politics on a global scale. Further, many of the developing
nations claim that the United States, in the name of non-
proliferation, seeks to implement policies that are highly
discriminatory to the non-nuclear states and are designed to
maintain American political, military, and economic power at
the expense of the poorer nations. Hence, no global
consensus exists on either the threat posed by nuclear
proliferation or the steps that should be taken to deal with
it. Instead, this issue inflames domestic debate in many
nations, strains alliance relationships, sharpens the
confrontation between East and West, and complicates
concepts of national and international security. Within
this framework of the threat of general nuclear war exists a
concern for accidental or unintentional nuclear war.
We are rapidly approaching a decisive point of demarca-
tion in the history of the nuclear arms race; namely, the
first strike counter-force threshold. This means both the
arsenals of the United States and the USSR will be highly
vulnerable to surprise attack. As a result, efforts to
control the momentum and direction of the nuclear arms race
are increasingly complicated and the possibility for acci-
dental war substantially grows.
Senator Mark Hatfield describes the threat as our
perception of a Soviet weapons build-up, a nuclear blackmail
[Ref. Is p. 3]. He describes the Soviet Intercontinental
Ballistic Missile (ICBM) threat as impressive, yet destabi-
lizing, because we can no longer rely on technology to save
us from war. Following a decade of massive arms spending,
the Soviet Union comes to the current round of disarmament
talks with a suffering economy. Still, Hatfield claims, the
United States strategists point to the Soviet's apparent
10
superiority by counting the number of Soviet warheads and
comparing this to the number of our warheads. In this
paper, our real concern is not with the numbers question,
but with how accurately and quickly we can discern if we are
under attack and what should be the appropriate response.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. WHY STUDY THE PROBABILITY OF ACCIDENTAL NUCLEAR WAR?
1 . The Historical Perspective
From our everyday newspapers, we read about the
increasing tension and anxiety surrounding the strategic
forces of the United States. Since the close of World War
II, the Western Alliance has feared attacks from the Soviet
Union in Europe and in other United States defended territo-
ries, as well as the subjugation of its power and ideals to
the Communist philosophy. Of course, the Soviet Union fears
the same from the West. In between the super powers lie the
smaller nations, each wanting to expand their own influence
and power in the world in ways similar to the super powers,
especially by building or buying nuclear weapons. Thus,
early warning systems have grown to extreme importance over
the last thirty years.
Looking at the Soviet warning system raises some
deeply troubling issues. When it is examined as a system,
and not merely as a physical collection of radars and
computers, we see a consistency betwesn doctrine and capa-
bility. The Soviet doctrine is one of pre-emptive attack,
and the Soviet capability is a system of warning and command
that supports such a strategy. The Soviet experience of
invasion may help to explain the reason for this approach.
Ever since the Nazi's attack in 1941, the Kremlin
proscribed to the concepts of surprise attack, pre-emptive
attack, and automatic firing. These policies fuel our
apprehensions about the Soviets, particularly during times
of crisis. As recently as July 1982, Defense Minister
Dimitri Ustinov iterated the idea that the United States
12
should be denied the freedom of first use of nuclear
weapons. At the same time, he hinted at renewed Soviet
interest in a launch-on-wacning policy. It is a mistake to
discount Soviet statements as mere political bluff. Soviet
threats contain exaggeration, but they also have a rationale
that gives us insight into their thinking. Automatic or
quick-launch systems are a preeminent design goal for the
Soviet ICBM forces. These capabilities are not a by-product
of Soviet technology; they are a guiding principle, and they
continue to be an integral feature of the Strategic Rocket
Forces (SRF) .
The emphasis on pre-emption in Soviet peacetime
doctrine is, of course, no guarantee that pre-emption would
actually be used in a crisis. However, just the knowledge
of a pre-emptive philosophy adds to our fear of surprise
attack from Soviet forces. Also, it is unimaginable that
the Soviets would operate their nuclear forces in a launch-
on-warning mode during peacetime. The chief consequence of
their emphasis on pre-emption may be that it serves as an
indoctrinating force throughout their defense organization.
However, once a country incorporates a view of war into the
planning process, competing theories of conflict will prob-
ably receive less attention. By building an arsenal and a
training system directed toward pre-emptive attack, the
Soviets preclude alternative strategies from consideration.
Thus, it becomes more unlikely that plans could change at
the last moment in a crisis. Now, in the 1980s, the Soviets
have reached a virtual nuclear parity with the United
States. With an increase in the certainty of a successful
pre-emptive attack may come an increase in the probability
of nuclear war if East-West tensions are not reduced
[Ref. 2].
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2 - The Ca us es of the Concern
The major threatening influence on the evolution of
our warning system is the stationing of Soviet nuclear-
firing submarines near the coastlines of the United States.
Dp until the late 1960s, Soviet submarines were located
under the Arctic ice cap. A launch of a Submarine-Launched
Ballistic Missile (hereafter, SLBM) from that position
provided some time for decision makers to discuss and recom-
mend appropriate responses to that threat. Now, Soviet
Yankee and Delta class submarines regularly patrol near our
coasts [Ref. 3]. Depending on tactics and firing position,
these submarines could fire SLBHs at our bomber bases and
command centers with flight times ranging between 4 and 15
minutes. Then, they can aim at Washington, the North
American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) , and the
Strategic Air Command (SAC) in an effort to paralyze the
retaliatory forces of the United States. Even if our forces
would be paralyzed only temporarily, an SLBM attack allows
enough time to follow up with an all-out ICBM attack from
Soviet missile fields.
Another cause for concern is Soviet rhetoric. In
the spring of 1983, Anatoly Alexandrov, the President of the
Soviet Academy of Sciences, announced:
"The Soviet Union will adopt a policy of automatic
massive retaliation against all potential enemies if the
new American medium-range nuclear missiles are deployed
in Western Europe." [Ref. 4]
Although the Soviets frequently hint at using a launch-on-
warning posture, Alexandrov* s remarks are more definite than
previous statements of the Soviet position. Alexandrov
claims that the current balance of strategic forces allows
roughly 30 minutes for both sides to take steps to avoid a
nuclear confrontation. (This refers to the ICBM forces, but
14
not the SLBM forces.) He claims that the deployment of
missiles in Europe would limit this time span to 5-7
minutes; thus, precluding chances to avert an all-out
confrontation. However, he fails to mention the SLBM threat
which has about the same time span to avert a confrontation:
5-9 minutes versus 25-30 minutes for ICBMs. Although the
Soviet ICBM threat is potentially more destructive to our
retaliatory forces, the SLBM threat severely shortens
decision-making time which affects the launching of retalia-
tory forces.
The mechanisms which might precipitate an uninten-
tional or accidental nuclear war entail our steady
progression of technological advances in eguipment, such as
satellite sensors, and increasingly sophisticated computer
software. These enhanced capabilities allow faster evalua-
tion of events that take place in the atmosphere or space,
as well as on the ground, and they provide a clearer picture
of the global military situation. Yet, errors in the data
gathering function (which includes all sensors, communica-
tion links, and computer systems) already have caused false
alarms at NORAD, our main surveillance center. In this
discussion, a false ala rm is a display from the data gath-
ering system which indicates the launch of missiles towards
a United States defended area with impact points in that
area, but is, in fact, not real. Routine missile displays
do occur every year, but NORAD does not label these as false
alarms. Rather, NORAD resolves these routine missile
displays using the usual surveillance procedures prior to
any need for decisions from higher authority.
Four false alarms, occurring in the fall of 1979 and
the spring of 19 80, received international attention
[Ref. 5: p. 8]. However, NORAD located and corrected the
problems surrounding these alarms without an inadvertent
launch of retaliatory forces. Since then, the added care
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taken in the entire missile warning system has helped to
resolve incoming missile displays sooner, severely
curtailing false alarms. No false alarms have occurred
since 1980.
Another contribution to the cause of accidental
nuclear war is the greater international tension brought
about by our increased nuclear stance and the inclusion of
the Star Wars weapons system in our arsenal. This means
that the United States is willing to take a risk to protect
itself from the threat of an attack by establishing a
launch-under-attack policy. Most Americans believe that
their nation is not morally capable of initiating a nuclear
war under any situation. Yet, the initiation of a policy,
like launch-under-attack or launch-on-warning, sends a
signal to our potential enemies. It is important in the
interest of peace that the Soviets clearly perceive our true
intentions.
3. The Problem of Acci denta l Nuclear War
The main goal of the United States military is to
enhance the capabilities of our weapons if we must use them,
and to increase weapon survivability if we are pre-emptively
attacked. But we also desire the possibility of launching
our weapons to be zero when we are not under attack. We can
describe this conflict using a Type I/Type II error model.
A Type I error occurs when an attack is coming, but the
warning process fails and indicates that we are not under
attack; thus, no counter-strike is launched. k Type II
error occurs when no attack is forthcoming, but the warning
process fails and indicates that we are under attack; thus,
a counter-strike is launched when no threat exists, leading
to an accidental nuclear war. The matrix in Figure 2.1
below delineates the possibilities:
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Figure 2.1 Type I/Type II Error flatrix
The two error types occur where the asterisks (*)
are located. On the one hand, we want to lower the
probability of not launching a retaliatory strike when we
are under attack (the military does not want to make this
mistake). On the other hand, we also want to lower the
probability of launching a retaliatory strike when we are
not under attack (i. e. , causing an unintentional nuclear
war) . Note the trade-off involved with the two error types:
we can not lower the probability of one error type without
raising the probability of the other, due to the very nature
of Type I/Type II errors. But we can continue to search for
a policy which gives the best balance between Type I and
Type II errors.
**• Previous Investigations of the Problem
The incidents of false alarms at NORAD generated
several studies and sparked a renewed interest in launch
policies. These studies focused on a need to watch false
17
alarms, since a false alarm that is not resolved could lead
to accidental nuclear war.
Bereaau built an analytical model on the self-
activation of a nuclear weapons system [Refs. 6,7]- His
molel assumes that both the United States and Soviet warning






















Figure 2.2 The Bereanu Model
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This gigantic system contains four components--the United
States warning system, the United States launch system, the
Soviet warning system, and the Soviet launch system.
Bereanu argues that if the United States warning system
responds to an alarm, it will automatically trigger the
United States launch system which automatically triggers
the Soviet warning system which automatically triggers the
Soviet launch system all of which leads to a nuclear war.
And, if this was a false alarm, it would lead to an acci-
dental nuclear war.
Bereanu 1 s model also assumes that more and more of
the human decision making will be turned over to a computer
system. Thus, Bereanu implies that if the computer system
errs and reports a missile launch when, in fact, no launch
has occurred, the decision maker will automatically respond
in kind; that is, launch a missile in retaliation. However,
is the total system interlocked and automatic? This ques-
tion will be addressed in the following chapters.
Sennott and Crissey developed a computer simulation
model and a queuing theory model to show how increasing
false alarms lead to an increase in the probability of acci-
dental nuclear war [Eef. 8]. The basis of their study
revolves around the apparent increasing number of false
alarms, but using a different definition of false alarm than
we use in this paper. Sennott and Crissey define "false
alarms" as conferences called to evaluate possible threats
(which are otherwise known as missile display conferences)
and use the data to predict the frequency of such threats in
their models. They then claim that accidental nuclear war
will occur if a false alarm takes too long to resolve. That
is, if the time required to resolve the alarm exceeds the
us e them or lose them point, then retaliation is automatic.
They also equated false alerts with threat assessment
conferences. However, these definitions do not coincide
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with NORAD's definition of a false alarm (which is incorpo-
rated into our definition) , and this difference may affect
the conclusions of their research.
Steinbruner discusses the background of the launch-
under-attack policy, an ICBM scenario, and then centers on
the command, control, and communications (C 3 ) problem
[Ref. 9]. He also includes the BrDokings model written by
Morawski and Blair. This model simulates the performance of
the C 3 system under four kinds of damage conditions and
investigates the ability of the system to retaliate. The
article concludes by stating that even our considering a
launch-under-attack policy demonstrates the increasing
tensions between ourselves and the Soviets.
The authors mentioned above (as well as others
referenced) hold the common view that the world is on the
brink of accidental nuclear war. With increased interna-
tional tension, coupled with the increasing number of
missile displays, this conclusion might appear true on the
surface. Even using the definition of a false alarm as
delineated by Sennott et al , the apparent increase in these
alarms may be explained by the following facts: (1) more
sensitive sensors are on line and operators must continue to
calibrate, test, and evaluate them; (2) the Soviets have
increased their testing of missiles; and (3) the Joint
Chiefs of Staff have revised the criteria for convening
missile display conferences. Even if intelligence provides
information regarding a test shot, NORAD continues to
monitor, evaluate, and test its system on these live
launches. Thus, the detection of any launch is added to the
permanent record.
Several of the authors assumed that the man-in-the-
loop would lose control of the decision-making process by
being left out at certain points in the process, or that the
data gathering system makes the man-in-the-loop' s decision
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more automatic. On that basis, the decision to launch is
then automatically carried out by the computer system. This
view misses the intimate relationship between warning and
alert levels on the one hand, and control of offensive
weapons on the other. It also fails to consider the checks
and balances (that is, the man-in-the-loop) set up
throughout the entire missile warning system.
Many differing opinions concerning different policy
types and policy definitions exist among the authors cited.
Sennott et al define launch-on-warning to mean if a situ-
ation can not be called a non- threat, then it is a threat;
. therefore, launch [Ref. 8: p. 2]. However, this definition
does not completely cover the current decision process
employed by NORAD. Steinbruner* s definition is very vague;
he defines launch-under-attack (egual to launch-on-warning)
as launching missiles after acquiring reliable evidence that
a Soviet attack is underway before its actual effects are
felt [Ref. 9: p. 37]. Bracken uses the term automatic
retaliation, but defines launch-on- warning to include the
military decision makers, who are given emergency authority
to use nuclear weapons in advance of hostilities, and who
are further instructed to use this authority if indications
of an attack arise. Then, Bracken states that a launch-on-
warning strategy does not require any computers or radar,
although they are necessary to implement such a strategy
smoothly.
Although many different launch policies appear in
different articles, only two stand out as viable alter-
natives—launch-under-attack and launch-on-warning. As
described above, definitions of these policies vary widely,
depending on the source. We offer clearer definitions in
Chapter V and further pursue their implications.
In all the cited articles, the authors hardly
considered NORAD, left out the actual decision process, and
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over-simplified or overlooked many assumptions. Although
these discussions thoroughly delineated the problem, little
has been written to answer the questions they raise. We
investigate and discuss these questions in Chapters III and
IV.
B. METHODOLOGY OF THIS STUDY
In the next two chapters, we discuss two parts of the
missile warning function—data gathering and decision
making. These two separate, yet interrelated, parts demon-
strate the role the man-in-the-loop plays and the importance
of maintaining this role as we consider the implications of
certain launch policies.
The Data Gathering Model completely covers all of the
mechanical aspects— sensors, ground stations, command
posts— as well as describing decision rules, such as dual
phenomenology. The Data Gathering Model also presents
several scenarios of interest with an accompanying sensi-
tivity analysis to show how time affects the decision- making
process.
The Decision Model adds decision points to the Data
Gathering Model and incorporates in greater detail the same
scenarios from the Data Gathering Model. The sensitivity
analysis further directs attention toward the need for a
policy to balance the current situation. In Chapter V, we
discuss two types of launch policies and their implications.
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III. DATA GATHERING MODEL
A. THE CURRENT MISSILE ATTACK WARNING SYSTEM
The Missile Attack Warning System consists of three
parts: (1) sensors to detect a missile launch, (2) computer
centers and communication links to process and distribute
the data from the warning system, and (3) command posts
which analyze data and assess the implications of the
warning information and direct appropriate actions. Major
components of each of the above parts follow:
1 • Missile Warning Sensors
a. Satellite Early Warning System (SEWS)
— detects infrared trail of a burning missile motor
— provides overlapping coverage for the Soviet Union and
China (for ICBMs)
— provides overlapping coverage for the Atlantic and
Pacific Oceans (for SLBMs)
—transmits real-time information due to the nature of the
SLBM detection problem
--ground stations process and forward data to the command
posts
b. Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (3MEWS)
0) Large Tracking Radar in Greenland, England ,
and Alaska.
— detects and continuously searches for an object
--operates on several UHF frequencies
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— provides precise data on the character and magnitude of
a missile attack
(2) S tatic Radar in Greenland and Alaska.
--evaluates missile position and velocity
— calculates the trajectory, impact point, impact time,
and launch point
c. Pave Paws
— a large multi-targeting phased array radar in California
and Massachusetts
— operated and maintained by the Strategic Air Command
—primarily detects SLBMs
— relays the characterization of the attack to NORAD, SAC,
and the National Command Authorities (NCA)
— simultaneously detects and discriminates many objects
while providing early warning data, launch, impact,
position, and velocity information
--provides automatic detection, track initiation, and
mission decisions
— operates at UHF frequencies
d. Perimeter Acquisition Radar Attack Character-
ization System (PAECS)
—
'located in North Dakota
—
-tracks incoming ICBfls




e. Two Radars in the Southern United States
— long range phased array radars
— uses pattern recognition of current space objects
--back-up system performs a full search with human
intervention
—operates on UHF frequencies
— supplements SLBM detection from the Gulf of Mexico
--receives inputs from BMEWS and the United States Navy
Space Surveillance (SPASUR) network
f. Cobra Dane
— a large, real-time tracking phased array radar in the
Aleutian Islands of Alaska
--detects and tracks ICBMs, SLBMs, and satellites
— predicts impact points
— primarily collects intelligence data
2 . Gro un d Processing and Comrnan ication System
— ground stations in the continental United States and
overseas which process the data from the sensors
—communication processing stations co-located with the
sensors
A thorough discussion of the communication function follows




a. North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)
— described later in Section D of this chapter
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b. Strategic Air Command (SAC)
—located (underground) in Omaha, Nebraska
— has the authority and responsibility to launch the
nuclear bomber force to protect it
— maintains a small percentage of the bomber force on
constant alert
—operates and constantly maintains an airborne command
post
c. National Military Command Center (NMCC)
— located in the Pentagon
—anticipates and evaluates foreign crises
— point of contact for the President to obtain information
and command the nuclear forces
d. Alternate National Military Command Center
(ANMCC)
— located (underground) in Fort Richie, Maryland
—acts as the alternate location for NMCC with the same
functions as NMCC
The missile warning system employs a two-step process
for identifying a missile launch and assessing the threat to
the North American continent. First, the infrared warning
satellites detect the infrared signature of a burning
missile motor. Ground-based radars provide back-up confir-
mation data and rely on detection using a different physical
phenomenon; i. e., radar tracking of a physical object as
opposed to detecting the infrared signature. This two-step
process is called dual pheno menology and minimizes the like-
lihood of mistaking some natural phenomenon for a launch of
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an enemy's missile. For the purposes of this thesis, dual
ph enomenology; means the use of different types or families
of sensors to detect the same launch.
The BMEWS radar confirms and characterizes a polar ICBM
attack. Pave Paws radar detects SLBM launches and SEWS
covers both ICBMs and SLBMs. Thus, after the detection of
an infrared signature, the BMEWS radars would be the first
to detect ICBMs; the Pave Paws radar would be the first to
detect SLBMs launched off either coast. The twD radars in
Florida perform the same function as the Pave Paws radar for
missiles coming from the Gulf of Mexico.
The satellites and Pave Paws radar, the two sensors that
detect the attack of SLBMs, feed their data directly to all
four major command posts (so all four receive and evaluate
the data simultaneously) . In addition, NORAD transmits its
analysis of any SLBM attack to the other three command
posts. Thus, the duty officers at the other sites have two
separate computations and displays of the SLBM launches.
Data from all other warning sensors feed only into the NORAD
command post, where it is analyzed. The other three command
posts then receive the results of the NORAD analysis by
transmission over the communication lines.
In order to ensure that the communication lines between
NORAD and the other three command posts remain open, NORAD
constantly transmits messages to the other sites over
circuits that would transmit an actual attack. Normally,
this message contains test data so that all three sites can
monitor the condition of their communication links from
NORAD. If the system works properly, all command posts
receive similar information. When any indication of a real
threat exists, including ambiguous data, the four command
posts begin a conferencing procedure to evaluate and assess
the data available.
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If the Soviets launch SLBMs and ICBMs separately or
simultaneously, the following sequence of events probably
would occur:
1. Satellites detect launches of SLBMs or ICBMs shortly
after launch.
2. Pave Paws radar picks up the SLBMs 2-5 minutes after
launch.
3. BMEflS radar picks up the ICBMs within 10 minutes of
their launch.
4. PARCS radar picks up the ICBMs in the terminal phase
of flight.
Approximately 9-12 minutes exist between launch and impact
of an SLBM. Time between launch and impact of an ICBM is
approximately 25-3 minutes. Since an SLBM can destroy a
large portion of our ground-based sensors and command posts,
the time our current system is fully operational could be
severely shortened. This does not mean that the entire
system would disappear at the end of the approximate 9 min-
ute period. But then we could only depend on those assets
that survive the initial attack; that is, assets that are
airborne in time to escape the attack. Thus, the short
interim between detection of an attack and destruction of
the major portion of our command and control structure puts
a severe stress on the decision maker.
B. SENSOR PROCESSING
The sensor evaluation process entails the following
steps:
1. An event triggers a sensor.
2. The satellite sensor relays a signal to its respective
ground station.
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3. The sensor ground station computer interprets the
radar signals.
4. The computer system analyzes the signals.
5. The computer system relays its analysis to the system
operator
.
6. The computer system generates a message to the command
posts.
7. The command post verifies if an actual message was
sent .
8. The sensors continue to follow the path of the object
and send update messages .
In every step of the above procedure, the man-in-the-
loop, observes and evaluates the processed data. Therefore,
the processed data will be declared a false alarm if, in the
experience of the man-in-the-loop, the processed warning
data indicates a false display of a launch which may be
caused by some natural phenomenon, or the man-in-the-loop
has little confidence in what the computer system tells him
about the supposed threat. Likewise, if a computer compo-
nent fails, perhaps generating a false display, but the
sensors never register a missile launch, then the man-in-
the-loop will also recognize this as a false alarm.
C. COMMAND CENTER PROCESSING
Both NORAD and SAC receive missile warning data from
SEWS and Pave Paws radars. NORAD receives data from BMEWS,
Cobra Dane, and PARCS radars and sends summary messages to
SAC. NMCC and ANMCC receive only a summary of the missile
warning data from NORAD. Since NORAD obtains more informa-
tion (ICBM and SLBM data) than any other command post in the
29
system, the Commander-in-Chief of NORAD (hereafter, CINC
NORAD) assesses the sensor warning data.
If the data gathering system indicates a launch,
specialized centers in the Cheyenne Mountain Complex are
activated. The Missile Warning Center calls the individual
sensor sites to confirm the validity of the indication of
launched missiles. The Space Center states whether the
indicator is or is not one of the over 4,000 objects already
in space. The Solar Center reports any solar activity. The
Intelligence Center discloses any information which would
add to the definition of the indicator. With all this
information combined, CINC NORAD makes a total assessment of
whether the indicator is a real launch threat to North
America.
If the satellites trigger the warning process, any one
of the four command posts can call a conference. At the
conference, CINC NORAD makes decisions regarding the
threat/no threat situation evaluated by the sensors with
inputs from the other command posts. Me discuss this
conferencing procedure in detail in Chapter IV.
D. NORAD' S ORGAHIZATION AND MISSION
1. The Sarlj History of N ORA D
To better understand the Data Sathering Model, and
later, the Decision Model, it is important to realize where
NORAD fits into the picture and how NORAD* s mission affects
the question of accidental nuclear war.
By the mid-fifties, the United States Air Force had
the technology of continuous warning information. Only by
redesigning their formal organizational structure to fit
this new information technology could the Air Force pros-
ecute a war successfully. This resulted in the creation of
NORAD in 1957. As the central processor of real-time
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warning information, NORAD became a joint United States-
Canadian command because of the location of radars and
fighter bases in Canada. Its job included the integration
of BMEWS, Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) , Distant Early
Warning (DEW) Line, and other information sources for an
overall warning estimate that would be relayed to other
command centers, such as S&C and the Pentagon.
NORAD is the central command post for continuously
monitoring warning and intelligence information from
multiple sources. It is, then, the central coordinating
institution responsible for determining when the United
States is under attack.
NOBAD serves a critical alerting role in an elabo-
rate system of institutional checks and balances to prevent
unauthorized or inadvertent use of nuclear weapons, either
of which could lead to a nuclear war. The Commander-in-
Chief of SAC (hereafter, CINC SAC) does have the authority
to order the launch of the bomber force in order to prevent
its destruction on the ground by incoming enemy missiles.
However, this authority depends crucially on the threat of
incoming enemy attack, a condition determined by CINC NOPAD.
2. Today's NORAD
Today, NORAD is a bi-national partnership between
the United States and Canada; CINC NORAD is also the
commander of the United States component, the Aerospace
Defense Command (ADCOM) . Canadian forces come from the
Canadian Forces Air Defense Group, headquartered at North
Bay, Ontario. The senior representative of the Canadian
Forces is the Vice Commander-in-Chief of NORAD. CINC NORAD
reports to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) as representing
the Specified Command, ADCOM. As the Commander of Aerospace
Defense Center, he reports directly to the Chief of Staff of
the Air Force.
31
The NORAD mission includes:
(1) Tactical warning and attack assessment of bomber or
ballistic missile attack on North America
(2) Space surveillance, tracking, and cataloging of all
human-made objects in space
(3) Satellite protection of friendly satellites, pro-
viding collision-avoidance and other flight
condition information
(U) Satellite attack warning and verification for all
United States satellites
(5) Peacetime surveillance, detection, and identification
of aircraft
(6) Support for the Space Shuttle missions
(7) Operational control of United States and Canadian Air
Defense Forces
Also, NORAD has the responsibility to JCS to provide world-
wide detection of missile launches and nuclear events. This
includes the Pacific area and Europe, as well as the area
adjacent to the North American Continent.
To accomplish its mission, NORAD exercises opera-
tional control of the detection and communications systems,
and it operates and maintains the analytical systems in the
NORAD Cheyenne Mountain Complex (NCMC) . NCMC provides NCA
and CINC SAC with real-time missile warning messages and
NORAD confidence assessments.
The NORAD command post is in the underground
Cheyenne Mountain Complex in Colorado. A worldwide network
of sensors gathers and processes missile warning information
and distributes warning messages to other United States and
Canadian command posts.
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NORAD does not engage in any active defense such as
ballistic missile defenses designed to intercept ICBMs and
SLBHs. This task is reserved for SAC. Specifically, NORAD
employs passive defenses that protect targets by such means
as warning, mobility, and sheltering forces.
E. DATA GATHEBIHG MODEL FORMULATION
In order to formulate the Data Gathering Model, we must
establish several basic assumptions about the data gathering
process. Three examples then illustrate the importance of
time: we will model an ICBM scenario, an SLBM scenario, and
a test shot scenario.
First, we assume the timely detection of incoming
missiles. Timely detection of missiles determines how
quickly a response to an actual or imagined threat can be
made. Success in preventing an accidental nuclaar war, or
in protecting strategic forces, depends on the fastest
possible identification: the sooner an incoming object is
identified as a threat or non-threat, the more time is
available for decision makers to consider appropriate
responses.
Second, we assume that communications remain intact over
the entire system until the missiles impact. This assump-
tion requires some explanation. As discussed in Steinbruner
[Ref. 9: p. 40 3# an electramagnetic pulse (EMP) from an
exoatmospheric nuclear explosion would cause interruption of
non-hardened and long range (HF, LF) communications. To
overcome the effects of EMP, redundant messages sent over
the communication lines contain less information, ensuring
that some information gets through the system. However, it
takes at least 7 minutes after an SLBM launch before the
first exoatmospheric explosion occurs. Also, we will not
consider sabotage or human errors which could also disrupt
communications.
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Third, we assume that the computer system, which
contains a large number of components (both hardware and
software) , has high reliability. Performance of the missile
warning task requires the use of computers and high-speed
communication systems which both sometimes produce erroneous
data. However, dependency on computers does not imply
control by them, since the data gathering system only
reports and evaluates missile warning data while a
complet ely different computer system controls the procedure
for launching missiles. At every step of the process,
experienced personnel evaluate and judge the meaning of the
incoming data. Only these trained personnel can direct any
action in response to what the warning system reports.
Thorough investigations of previous false alarms led to more
stringent policies and practices throughout the missile
warning system, severly curtailing the possibility of an
inadvertent launch. The additional vigilance of the man-in-
the-loop makes inadvertent launches even less likely.
1 . The Generic Model
As stated before, the Data Gathering Model consists
of a continuous time line broken into finitely many (some-














Figure 3. 1 The Generic Data Gathering Hodel
where tO = time of launch
t1 = first detection
t2 = system evaluation of launch (threat/no
threat)
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t3 = second detection
tU = assessment of launch by decision makers
(threat/no threat)
t5 = last possible time to decide on the
type of response (launch/no launch)
t6 = time of impact
The time line, over which observations are taking
place, starts with the friendly forces detecting the
launching of missiles, and ends with the impact of missiles.
Each t(i) is the time when the data gathering system de-
tects, evaluates, and completes its analysis of the sensor
data and passes along the information to the decision-making
system so evaluation of the threat can be resolved prior to
impact. The minimum time to resolution (that is, the min-
imum amount of time in which to make a decision to launch or
not launch) = (t5-t3). Note that to, t5, and t6 are fixed
points, and if t4 is greater than t5, a serious problem




Starting with the least stressful situation, an
ICBM launch scenario, the model describes the following:
tO t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6
time of flight I 1 1 1 1 1 I13 5 7 27 30 minutes
launch impact
Figure 3.2 An ICBM Scenario
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As in the general case above, the definitions of to through
t6 remain the same. The minimum time to resolution of the
threat is (t5-t3) = 22 minutes.
b. SLBM Scenario
The model below describes an SLBM launch
scenario:
tO tl t2 t3 t4 t5 t6
time of flight I 1 I 1 1 1 1
1 3 5 7 9 12 minutes
launch impact
Figure 3.3 An SLBM Scenario
Again, the definitions for tO through t6 remain
the same. Notice that the time of flight for the SLBMs
extremely shortens the amount of decision and response time.
Here, the minimum time to resolution is (t5-t3) = 4 minutes.
c. Test Shot Scenario
The model below describes the situation where
the data gathering system monitors test shots of missiles:
tO t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6
time of flight I 1 1 1 1 -I 1
6 1 3 5 7 9 22 minutes
launch impact
Figure 3.U A Test Shot Scenario
Usually, in a test shot, the Intelligence Center
informs CINC NORAD that a test shot has been scheduled.
However, whether or not intelligence is available, the data
gathering system treats a test shot as a regular launch and
calculates an impact point. By t3, the decision makers
realize it is a test shot, but continue the assessment
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process for intelligence gathering. In this example, the
minimum time to resolution is (t5-t3) = 4 minutss.
F. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
The critical area of sensitivity analysis lies in the
data processing times in the above three examples. The
longer it takes to process incoming data, the lass time
remains to make important decisions on whether we should
launch our missiles. Thus, shorter processing times buy
more decision time (which becomes more precious as the
scenarios get more complex) .
Some uncertainty exists in the Data Gathering Model.
For instance, sensors and computer hardware components do
fail, computer software is not totally error frse, and
computer operators do make errors. All of these failures
have occurred at least once at NOEAD [Ref. 5: pp. 5-9].
However, in every case, NORAD did discover the error and
improve its data gathering system.
In reality, the time segments of the above Data
Gathering Model are not as neat and precise as described.
As stated before, these segments overlap and, sometimes, one
event will occur before another.
Since satellites view the world from one vantage point
and ground stations view it from another, some discrepancies
arise that coul3 cause problems. For instance, if SEWS
picks up a launch in one place, but Pave Paws picks it up in
another, the system may display two launches even though
only one has actually occurred. Sometimes 4-5 missiles look
like 30, especially when debris is present. These possibil-
ities make it harder for the decision maker to state high or
low confidence in the assessment to the President and have
an effect on the President's own response decision.
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In the scenarios below, we explore the ramifications of
the overlapping time segments.
1 • The ICBM Threat
The interval between tO and t1 is split into two
pacts. In the first 30 seconds, a g.uick look report flags
some phenomenon which could be a launch. In the next 1.5
minutes, the initial report follows with the probable point
of launch (the azimuth) and the direction of launch. This
information assists the decision maker in determining
whether the launch is real or the system has failed. Since
processing occurs in the satellite and at ground stations,
the time from tO to t1 could be more than 2 minutes, when
the system delays to discriminate between a natural phenom-
enon and a real launch, or when the decision maker calls a
ground station to confirm the display on the command post's
computer monitor. In any case, when several satellites pick
up a possible launch, the data gathering system automati-
cally attempts to merge the individual reports into a single
message, then transmits this message to the decision maker.
In the interval between t1 and t2 (about 30 sec-
onds) , the data gathering system evaluates the possible
launch, and by t2, labels it a threat/no threat. The next
interval, from t2 to t3, which allows time for a second
detection, can become quite large. Depending on what sensor
picks up the launch, and the launch trajectory, this
interval could be anywhere between 3 and 7 minutes in
length. The interval between t3 and t4 is approximately 30
seconds. Figure 3.5 graphically represents these overlap-
ping intervals.
We now explain the reason for the 3-7 minute
interval from t2 to t3. There are four major phases in
launching an ICBM: boost, post-boost, mid-course, and
re-entry. The boost phase usually lasts several hundred
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3 21 minutes
2 0.5 7 0.5 17 3 minutes
time of flight I 1 1 !
J
1 I
tO tl t2 t3 tk t5 t6
launch impact
Figure 3.5 The ICBH Time Line
seconds, during which the missile starts at rest and accel-
erates to about 7 kilometers/second by the time it reaches
an altitude of about 200 kilometers. Typically, an ICBM is
a three-stage rocket, each stage contributing more than 2
kilometers/second to the missile velocity. During the boost
phase, satellite sensors can easily detect the launch, and
the missile is relatively vulnerable.
In sophisticated missile systems, a post-boost or
deployment phase follows the boost. This phase may last
another several hundred seconds. During this phase, a post-
boost vehicle maneuvers to achieve a variety of very precise
trajectories, and then deploys individual re-entry vehicles
on each trajectory. The post- boost vehicle carries a very
accurate inertial guidance system to determine its position
and velocity. It maneuvers to correct any trajectory errors
produced during the boost phase and places the individual
re-entry vehicles on slightly different trajectories to
attack different targets. The individual re-entry vehicles
are commonly known as Multiple Independently Targetable
Re-entry Vehicles (MIEVs) . Since the post-boost vehicle
uses a much lower thrust level than the booster, the rocket
exhaust is much less visible to sensors.
After the re-entry vehicles are deployed, they
follow their respective trajectories for approximately 1000
seconds, climbing to 1000 kilometers, and then falling
towards the earth, eventually re-entering the atmosphere.
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This is the mid-course phase. The final phase is re-entry
and lasts from 30 to 100 seconds, depending on the specific
trajectory and drag characteristics of the re-entry vehicle.
Figure 3.6 depicts three types of trajectories for an ICBM:
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Figure 3. 6 Three Possible ICBM Trajectories
Lofted trajectories (high re-entry angles) result in
greater re-entry vehicle deceleration, thus, requiring an
increased time of flight, since the flight path is longer.
However, this results in a much higher accuracy in hitting
the target.
In depressed trajectories (low re-entry angles) , the
re-entry vehicle heats up more, reducing the accuracy of the
missile. Note that the Pave Paws radar (for example) will
not pick up a depressed ICBM trajectory as guickly as it
picks up the other two types of trajectories. For both
radar and infrared sensors, the difficulty of the sensor's
job increases with increased range and increased field of
view.
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A given booster delivers a given payload to its
greatest range on the minimum energy trajectory and, hence,
is the most likely trajectory. This means that the minimum
time (shortest interval) to reach t3 for a loftad or minimum
energy trajectory is about 5,5 minutes. In the ICBM scen-
ario, 21.5 minutes remain for decision-making time before a
final response is reguired, and 24.5 minutes remain' before
impact of the missile. The maximum or longest interval of
time, (t3-t0) =9.5 minutes. Since the decision maker will
probably take 30 seconds to make an assessment of high or
low confidence, this allows the President about 21 minutes
in the minimum case, and 17 minutes in the maximum case, to
make his response (see Table I)
.
The minimum interval between t5 and t6 is about 3
minutes. This covers the reaction time required to launch
our missiles in a retaliatory strike. Reaction time
includes the encryption of messages to launch, the decryp-
tion of those messages upon receipt, double-checking the
messages for accuracy (that is, are they real orders?), and
the reguired number of personnel on the scene to unlock and
operate the missile system. Since we have never had to
perform this function, other than in a training exercise,
this minimum reaction time does not include any failures of
components in the launch system preventing the launch, fail-
ures of any personnel to perform their duties, nor any other
uncertainties that may occur. A more realistic time is
closer to 6 minutes. This amount of time accounts for the
completion of actions from the above 3 minutes, plus any
extra time for shock, confusion, dismay, denial, and undue
pressure that would arise from receiving a real launch
order. However, using 6 minutes as a maximum time reguired
to perform the launch sequence still leaves the President 18
minutes to decide a response to the threat in the minimum
case, and 1U minutes in the maximum case.
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2- The SLBi Threat
The time intervals up to and including t3 remain the
same here as in the ICBM scenario. However, the situation
drastically changes in this scenario due to the much shorter
time of flight of an SLBM:
3 3. 5 3 minutes
2 0.5 7 0.5 2 minutes
time of flight I 1 I I I 1 1
tO tl t2 t3 t4 t5 t6
laanch impact
Figure 3.7 The SLBM Time Line
Figure 3.8 below depicts the usual SLBM trajectory
(about 1000 miles from shore) together with a depressed SLBM
trajectory. This graph reveals that to obtain dual phenome-
nology (using Pave Paws as an example) , the time between t2
and t3 will increase with a depressed SLBM launch. This
result severely shortens the time for the decision maker to
assess the situation.
The graph in Figure 3. 9 shows the usual SLBM trajec-
tory together with an SLBM launch at 500 miles from the
coast (about as close as a submarine can get to launch an
SLBM if it is to hit its target). When launching an SLBM,
the trajectory will probably be lofted to attain enough
speed and height to successfully re-enter the atmosphere and
hit its target. Although this lofted trajectory is less
accurate in hitting the target, the interval between t2 and
t3 increases while the overall time of flight (tO to t6)
decreases. This results in decreasing the decision makers'
time. Therefore, the closer the launch is made to the
coast, the less time remains for the decision maker.
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Figure 3.8 Two Possible SLBM Trajectories




^\»«HIMUM IHIICT (KO»MAL) ITUJECTOrr
DEPRESSED TRAJECTORY^TV*^^ ^£
IMPACT 500 1000 MILES
Figure 3-9 Two Possible SLBM Trajectories
Recall that the minimum time to reach t3 is 5.5
minutes. In the SLBM scenario, this time leaves 3.5 minutes
decision-making time before the last moment a response can
initiate a retaliatory launch, and 6.5 minutes before the
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impact of the missile. The maximum time is (t3-t0) =9.5
minutes, which allows no decision-making time and 2.5
minutes to impact. This analysis explains why an SLBM
launch is so stressful for ,the decision maker.
The decision maker will probably take about 30
seconds to make an assessment and state either high or low
confidence. In the minimum case, this leaves 3 minutes for
the President to take action. In the maximum case, the
situation has advanced beyond the cut-off time to initiate a
launch order.
With 6 minutes as the maximum time required to
perform a launch sequence, that is, (t6-t5) = 6 minutes, a
decision maker would have sufficient time for assessment
since the minimum resolution time (t3-t0) =5.5 minutes, but
if the assessment takes the usual 30 seconds, no time
remains for the President. If the resolution time is
anywhere from the minimum (t3-t0) =5.5 minutes up to 6
minutes, the (Jnited States could still execute an actual
launch order in time. This situation illustrates that the
demand for reliability in dual phenomenology and reporting
high confidence, plus the demand for reliability in a launch
order, puts the decision maker in a severe time crunch. In
the case where t4 occurs after t5 , or when an SLBM is
launched from 500 miles vice 1000 miles, the overall system
permits no decision- making time at all.
The new capabilities of the cruise missile present a
worse case scenario shown in Figure 3.10. Currently, the
United States has no policy to deal with cruise missile
launches. With such a short warning time, a bomber attack
may be the only response possible. Although the cruise
missile is a limiting case (so we will not discuss it at
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Figure 3,10 A Cruise Missile Trajectory
The table below summarizes the times discussed in
the above analysis:
TABLE I







(3 minutes to impact)
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A. DESCRIPTION OF THE CURRENT DECISION PROCESS
The missile warning function involves two major Air
Force commands— NORAD and SAC. NORAD has the responsibility
for the management, maintenance, and operation of all the
early warning sensors, in addition to the overall air and
space defense of the United States. CINC NORAD has the
responsibility for the management and operation of the
command post at the Cheyenne Mountain Complex, plus the
responsibility for the interpretation of missile warning
data sent from SAC.
SAC's responsibilities include maintaining the airborne
command post, which conveys the launch order if the under-
ground command post is wiped out. SAC is also responsible
for operating its computer system, which receives missile
warning data from SEWS and NORAD. CINC SAC is personally
responsible for keeping the bomber and tanker forces in a
ready status in case they must be launched for surviv-
ability. When launched, the bomber force does not proceed
with an attack, but follows orders to go to holding posi-
tions where it waits for orders either to commence an attack
or return to base. SAC repeatedly practices this launching
procedure (using a small percentage of the force) to keep
the bomber forces continually ready.
A number of questions concerning IC3M silo vulnerability
and the missile accuracy of the Soviet SLBMs and ICBMs
persist. The big question in the decision model is "Will
our ICBMs be able to ride out an attack?" If we believe in
silo vulnerability and decide to launch a percentage of the
ICBMs in the event of a real threat, then the ICBMs are
committed and can not be recalled. In this situation, the
decision maker must face the decision to "use them or lose
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them." On the other hand, the other two legs of the stra-
tegic triad, submarines and the bomber force, are less vuln-
erable when deployed. These forces also remain under strict
human control at all times. Bombers can be recalled easily
from their holding stations, but the submarine forces have
more flexible instructions. These instructions restrain
submarine commanders from launching missiles without author-
ization or allow them to maintain a neutral position.
Generally, the more missiles launched, the easier it is
to decide a threat/no threat situation, since a massive
launch strongly indicates a real attack. The problem arises
when only one missile appears, if the sensors detect some
natural phenomenon, if spurious warning data enters the data
gathering system, or if a component in the system fails. If
the indication of a launch comes from the ocean, this
heightens the problem even more, since less time is avail-
able to evaluate, a.ssess, and respond to the threat. If
CINC NORAD assesses a single missile threat with high confi-
dence, the President's decision problem becomes extremely
difficult.
Next, we discuss three major components of the Decision
Model conference procedure: (1) the missile display confer-
ence, (2) the threat assessment conference, and (3) the
missile attack conference.
1 • The Missile Display Conference
Upon detecting a possible launch, the missile
warning system passes its analysis of threat/no threat to a
decision maker, and a formal missile display conferencing
procedure convenes to evaluate and assess the analysis. Any
of the four duty officers at the command posts may call this
initial conference, if the data gathering system at the
command post indicates a possible threat. CINC NORAD calls
a routine missile display conference whenever changes to the
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system (such as position or configuration changes to
sensors) , cause unusual information or conflicting data to
appear.
Since we must maintain a highly sensitive system,
many indications of detections arise that are evaluated as
not being associated with a real missile launch. Every year
many missile display conferences are called to deal with
events other than potentially threatening or ambiguous
missile launches.
CINC NORAD officially terminates a missile display
conference when the decision makers judge the available data
to indicate either the presence or absence of a threat to
North America. If the perceived threat turns out to be some
natural phenomenon such as a solar reflection, CINC NORAD
terminates the missile display conference, declaring the
situation as no threat. System operators at NORAD call the
ground sites to confirm what appears on their displays. If
nothing appears on the displays at the ground sites, the
system operators at NORAD will then trace the problem, but
CINC NORAD will not call a threat assessment conference (the
next conference in the decision process) . However, if the
situation at NORAD agrees with the display at the ground
stations, it is considered a threat. CINC NORAD then termi-
nates the missile display conference and takes the next step
by calling a threat assessment conference.
2 . The Threat A ssessment Conference
As stated above, if CINC NORAD judges a launch to be
a threat by confirming the incoming data with the ground
sites, he convenes a threat assessment conference. This
conference reguires the addition of more senior personnel to
assist the duty officers at the various command posts in
their evaluation of the confirmed threat. Senior personnel
include the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These
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personnel confer in order to determine the nature and magni-
tude of the threat to North America, and they direct prelim-
inary steps to be taken to enhance force survivability (such
as preparing for a SAC take-off.) CINC NORAD' s assessment
will contain either high or low confidence in what the
sensors reveal. At this time, if the ground stations report
a confirmation by more than one family of sensors, then CINC
NORAD reports hi^h confidence in the confirmed threat.
3« The Missile Attac k Conference
If CINC NORAD's assessment to the President contains
high, confidence, CINC NORAD then convenes a missile attack
conference which includes all senior personnel and the
President. No missile attack conference has ever been
called. To arrive at a missile attack conference, the
conclusions of the two previous conferences revealed that an
attack on North America is imminent. Since it takes time to
convene these conferences, time is at a premium.
B. UNCEBTAINTY II TBE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
Nuclear deterrence depends on maintaining the surviv-
ability of strategic forces. Uncertainty involving the
complete success of a missile attack on either the attack-
er's or defender's side acts as a powerful deterrent since a
first strike represents an unprecedented gamble. Intel-
ligence information is rarely complete and when decision
makers confront the uncertainty of a launch during a confer-
ence, they must weigh the logical consequences of such an
act and decide on a response to it. This deliberation
continues to erode the time remaining before our missiles
must be launched (or lost)
.
In deploying offensive forces for the purpose of deter-
ring war, the dominant peacetime objective is that of
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preventing accidental or unauthorized use of weapons.
Preventing errors of this type requires maintaining negative
cont rol. Negative c ontrol means that a variety of physical
constraints and organizational procedures make it highly
unlikely for any one individual to fire any nuclear weapons.
It is equally improbable that the necessary combination of
people required to fire these weapons, in the absence of
proper authority, could be organized.
If war actually were to break out, the dominant objec-
tive changes to the execution of retaliatory attacks. It
then becomes important to minimize failures to launch
weapons against preassigned targets. Preventing errors of
this type requires p ositive control : the smooth operation
and precise timing required to launch missiles. Negative
and positive control inherently conflict; enhancing one
diminishes the other to an extent determined by the details
of the command arrangements for particular weapon systems
[Bef. 9: p. 38].
The issue of positive and negative control brings up
additional uncertainty, in the form of proper timing of a
launch. The decentralization problem made by the great
destructiveness of nuclear weapons emphasizes the conflict
between positive and negative control. A single location,
or even a few locations, can not control a modern strategic
arsenal since these locations may be identified by the enemy
and pre-emptively destroyed. Thus, many military officers
at numerous locations (some mobile) maintain the physical
ability to fire nuclear weapons, although authorization must
be given and elaborate procedures followed. Since the
Soviets have reputed to do the same, more uncertainty
involving many more people with access to nuclear weapons
comes into play.
The response of the attacked nation is yet another
uncertainty. It is impossible to predict in advance how the
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politicians will act in the face of an actual attack. Arms
control treaties enhance the uncertainty in intelligence and
decision making when a possible launch arrives in the data
gathering system, since a treaty is designed to "keep the
peace." Because a surprise attack on our forces is practi-
cally unimaginable in peacetime, human operators may hesi-
tate and rely on the peacetime checks and balances designed
to keep our forces from going to war accidentally. The key
problems here involve our belief that nuclear attack and war
are unthinkable, dampening our response behavior to launch,
which reguires precise timing. Improving the warning
sensors and the communication lines may ease the problem,
but such improvements can not completely solve it. Because
decades have passed without attack, and since the implica-
tions of authorizing a nuclear war are unthinkable, the
President, as well as other senior military personnel in
charge of the response, may be unwilling to launch any
missiles immediately upon receipt of the news of an
impending attack. This hesitation in response could seal
our fate. The longer the assessment and conferencing proce-
dures take, the more opportunity the first striker has to
attack again and further disrupt the reactions of the
victim. The victim would have to meet the attacker's first
strike with carefully planned strikes against the attacking
nation's sensor and warning systems, as well as against
military forces, in order to disrupt the attacker's ability
to engage in additional strikes. The victim must launch a
retaliatory attack during, or soon after, the first strike.
Unavoidable false alarms from the data gathering system,
or from human error, contribute to the slowing of the deci-
sion process, since it takes longer to confirm an alarm as
false. While the complexity of the system does make us
safer from accidental nuclear war, it only protects us
against isolated failures. Multiple errors or malfunctions
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invoke confusion in humans that leads to a longer resolution
time of the alarm. Since the problem with compound errors,
especially human ones, also increases the number of possible
outcomes, no system can protect against all combinations.
The likelihood that multiple events lead to trouble in-
creases as the activity around a possible threat increases.
Thus, the complexity of the warning system may amplify
mistakes when forces are placed on alert.
C. DECISION H0DE1 FORMULATION
Let us assume that the Soviets have the ability to
launch successfully a cooriinated attack. Such an attack
requires proper timing in order to minimize interference
between exploding warheads in the same general area [Ref. 9:
p. 39].
Again, we use a simple time line to model the decision-
making process. We illustrate the decision process by
including three examples: (1) an ICBM scenario, (2) an SLBM
scenario, and (3) a test shot scenario. We assume that the
time of flight of a missile is independent of decision-
making time. Also, we assume that the decision process
presented in Section A of this chapter pertains here.
Again, we assume the timely detection of launched
missiles. Timely detection and analysis by the sensors
allows more time for the evaluation and decision-making
process and for response to the threat as discussed in
Chapter III. Also, we assume uninterrupted communications
over the entire system.
The Decision Model time line includes the incorporation
of the different conferences, and the minimum time to reso-
lution is the minimum amount of time in which the decision
makers must decide to launch or not launch a counter-strike.
Recall that, in any scenario, the way NORAD handles a
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situation remains the same. The same scenarios presented in
Chapter III are now re- visited below:
1 . The Generic Mod el
This scenario describes a generic launch:
time of flight I 1— | I 1 1 1 i 1 JTO T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8 T9
launch impact
Figure 4. 1 The Generic Decision Model
where TO = time of launch
T1 = first detection
T2 = system evaluation of launch (threat/no
threat)
T3 = missile display conference called
T4 = second detection
T5 = threat assessment conference called
T6 = assessment of launch by decision makers
(threat/no threat)
T7 = missile attack conference called
T8 = last possible time to decide on the type
of response (launch/no launch)
T9 = time of impact
Thus, the minimum time to resolution is (T8-TU)
.
The suggested times in the following scenarios indi-
cate reasonable times to impact for the purposes of discus-




This scenario describes an ICBM launch:
time TO T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8 T9
flight 1 23 56 §4 27 30 minutes
launch impact
Figure 4.2 An ICBM Scenario
The definitions of TO through T9 remain the same and the
minimum time to resolution is (T8-I4) = 22 minutes.
b. SLBM Scenario
This scenario describes an SLBM launch:
time TO T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8 T9
flight 12356789 12 minute:
launch impact
Figure 4.3 An SLBM Scenario
The definitions of TO through T9 remain the same. Thus, the
minimum time to resolution is (T8-T4) = 4 minutes.
c. Test Shot Scenario
This scenario demonstrates how a test shot
affects the decision-making process as shown in Figure 4.
4
below. In this example, the minimum time to resolution is
(T8-T4) = 4 minutes. Even if intelligence reports a test
shot, the conferencing procedure continues as if it is an
unknown threat. At T4, the data gathering system evaluates
no threat based on the projected point of impact (usually





TO T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6
4~\—i—|—4—k'-Y T7 T8 T98 9 22 minutes
launch impact
Figure 4.4 A Test Shot Scenario
shot, and CINC NORAD will not call a threat assessment
conference. In this example, T5, T6 , T7 , and T8 may never
occur; however the launch will continue to be monitored to
gather as much intelligence data as possible.
In the case of a launch indicator lacking dual
phenomenology, at T4 , the decision makers assess the situ-
ation and state whether they have higji or low confidence in
what the data gathering system tells them. As before, the
process continues until full confirmation is made or the
sensors stop picking up the launch indicator.
In the Decision Model, human intervention flays
a key role which can not be over-emphasized. Human inter-
vention is both a positive and a negative aspect; positive
because more minds influence the decision-making process and
because a launch in retaliation is not automatic but
requires human intervention to activate the launch mecha-
nisms. The negative aspects include the increased time it
takes for a decision to be made by a team of decision
makers. Moreover, these decision makers are only human and,
therefore, prone to error.
D. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Since the Decision Model is an extension of the Data
Gathering Modal, we will transfer the ideas from the sensi-
tivity analysis of the Data Gathering Model to the sensi-
tivity analysis of the Decision Model. In Figure 4.5 below,
the corresponding points of the two models are shown:
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i 1 1 1 1
TO Tl T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 TV T8 T9
launch impact
Figure 4.5 Corresponding Points of the Two Models
From our analysis of the Data fathering Model, we
observed that the time segments of the Decision Model are
not as precise as shown in Section C of this chapter. These
segments also overlap and one event may occur before
another. We discuss this overlap problem in the examples
below.
1« lie ICBi Threat
The events TO, T1, and T2 (which correspond to tO
,
t1 , and t2 in the Data Gathering Model) take the same amount
of time as described in Section F of Chapter III. However,
the missile display conference T3 can not be called until T2
= t2 occurs. At the point T3, the duty officers of all the
command posts confer to decide if the threat is real or
false. If no conflicting information arises, and the deci-
sion makers readily agree, this decision-making process,
which includes confirmation from the ground site, will take
about 2 minutes. Figure 4.6 displays the time span and will
be explained below. Note the independent overlap of T4 with
T5, T6, and T7:
56
<- TU *
time TO T1 T2 T3 T5 T6 T7 T8 T9
flight 2 2.5 3 5 6 6.5 27 30 minutes
lauQch impact
Figure 4.6 Decision Hodel Time Line for an ICBM Scenario
During this conferencing procedure, the data gath-
ering system continues to monitor the launch phenomenon. As
stated previously in the Data Gathering Hodel, the time to
obtain a second detection at TU (dual phenomenology) could
take anywhere from 3 to 7 minutes, depending on the
missile's trajectory. (Here, TU corresponds to t3 in the
Data Gathering Hodel.) This means that the minimum time
(shortest interval) to TU is still about 5.5 minutes and the
maximum time (longest interval) is about 9.5 minutes, but
the missile display conference T3 will occur prior to the
second detection TU. Even if dual phenomenology does not
occur after T3, CINC NORAD will call a threat assessment
conference at T5. If TU = 5.5 minutes, then CINC NORAD will
have high confidence before going on to T5 , and the threat
assessment conference will probably last about one minute.
However, if TU = 9.5 minutes (or longer), this will not be
the case. The decision makers will probably want more time
to assess the situation, hoping to obtain dual phenomenology
before going on to the missile attack conference at T7. By
T6, however, the decision makers will have made their
assessment (with or without dual phenomenology) . Then, CINC
NORAD will call the missile attack conference, reporting
either high or low confidence in the assessment to the
President.
In the minimum (shortest interval) case, with
TU = 5.5 minutes, if the missile display conference and the




(T7-T6) = 30 seconds, and if the missile attack
conference takes about 1 minute, then the President would
have (T8-T7) = 2 0.5 minutes to decide on his response and
23.5 minutes to impact at T9. However, if any of the
conferences (T3 , T5, T7) take longer than above, the time
between T7 and T8 will be shortened, leaving less time for
the President to make his decision.
In the maximum case, without waiting for dual pheno-
menology, the President would still have 20.5 minutes to
decide on his response, but he would be working with a low
confidence assessment. Any President is likely to be reluc-
tant in giving an order to retaliate without high confi-
dence. Thus, if TU =9.5 minutes and CINC NORAD waits for
dual phenomenology (although T5, T6, and T7 would still
occur while waiting) , then the President would have (T8-T7)
= 17.5 minutes. If the interval between T8 and T9 is actu-
ally 6 minutes (as proposed in Section F of Chapter III)
,
this would allow the President 17.5 minutes in the minimum
case and 13.5 minutes in the maximum case. The question of
waiting for dual phenomenology, therefore, becomes an impor-
tant one. We discuss the implications of various launch
policies which bear on this issue in Chapter 7.
2- The SLBM Threat
The time intervals up to and including IS remain the
same here as in the ICBM scenario. But the situation
becomes more stressful with the shorter time of flight for
an SLBM with the addition of conferences. Again, the situ-
ation regarding depressed, lofted, and minimum energy
trajectories of SLBMs applies here. The requirement for
dual phenomenology increases the time between T2 and T4
(corresponding to t2 and t3 in the Data Gathering Model)
when the SLBM is in a depressed trajectory. The same result
occurs if a submarine launches its SLBMs close to the coast
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as described in Chapter III. Figure 4.7 shows the time span
for an SLBM threat:
time TO T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8 T9
flight A 2 2.5 4 ? 5 6 6-5 4 "l 2 minutes
launch impact
Figure 4,7 Decision Model Time Line for an SLBM Scenario
The minimum time to T4 is 5.5 minutes. This time
permits only 3.5 minutes total decision-making time before a
response is required from the President and only 6.5 minutes
before impact of the missile. If the maximum time is
(T4-T0) =9.5 minutes, then no decision-making time exists,
and only 2.5 minutes remain to impact. As we mentioned
earlier, T4 overlaps T5 (T3 has already occurred). The
events T6, T7, and T8 can occur prior to T4 if the President
is willing to make a decision with a low confidence assess-
ment. However, if he requires dual phenomenology, T8 can
not occur until T4 occurs, thus, shortening the final
decision-making time. Any President with peaceful inten-
tions will wait until T4 occurs before giving an order to
retaliate. In the minimum case, the President has (T8-T7) =
2.5 minutes to make his response. In the maximum case, the
President has no time left.
With 6 minutes vice 3 minutes as the minimum time to
perform a launch sequence, that is, (T9-T8) = 6 minutes, the
President would have no time to think if (T4-T0) =9.5
minutes and dual phenomenology is required. In any case,
the conferences will have to be rushed (perhaps only 30
seconds apiece), if any assessment is to be given to the
President in time to launch a retaliatory strike (if that is
the President's chosen response.) Because of this extremely
shortened time interval, the President may be forced to make
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a decision with a low confidence assessment from CINC NORAD,
if dual phenomenology does not occur within 9 minutes after
a launch of an SLBM attack.
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7. THE PROBABILITY OF ACCIDENTAL NOCLEAR WAR
A. INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, we combine the Data Gathering Model and
the Decision Model to show the implications of policies such
as la unch-on-warning and launch-under- at tack for the early
warning system. We first describe the segment of the time
line that affects the decision to use one of these policies.
We assume the United States is operating under peacetime
conditions in this discussion. Tha time lines in Figure 5.1
represent the intervals of time during which launch policies
affect future decisions:
The Data Gathering Model
time of flight I I 1 | 1 1 —=
—
I 1 1
t6 t1 t2 t3 tU t5
launch
The Decision Model
time of flight I I ] I J 1 1 I I
TO T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 TV T8
launch
Figure 5-1 Affective Segment of the Time Line
The affective time lines do not include impact since after
T8 (t5) , no time remains to launch effectively a retaliatory
strike. Also, recall that a false alarm occurs if (1) a
launch detection occurs; (2) the data gathering system
labels it a threat by T2 when no threat exists; and (3) a
threat assessment conference is called at T5 before confir-







The following data comes from NORAD [Eef. 10] and shows
the number of conferences called from 1977-1983, including
the false alarms discussed earlier in Chapter II:
TABLE II
Emergency Action Conferences by Year
year routine missile conferences called threat
_ dts"pl"IY to™evatuati: assesshent








The routine missile display conferences do not fit any
of the previous definitions we used and, therefore, will not
be considered in this analysis. Note the number of confer-
ences called to evaluate possible threats (these are the
missile display conferences, as we defined them earlier).
The numbers appear to increase as the years progress.
However, we explained the cause of this behavior in Chapter
II. The false alarms that occurred in 1978, 1979, and 1980
resulted in the threat assessment conferences that were
called. However, in those cases, confirmation of the threat
was not made: in each case, the response from the site
indicated that a. threat did not exist. In fact, the site
had absolutely no indication of a launch on their display.
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The procedures followed in those years differ from the way
CINC NORAD currently calls threat assessment conferences.
Today, if no confirmation comes from the site, CINC NORAD
probably will stop the conferencing process at that point to
determine if thare is a failure at NCMC. Thus, a threat
assessment conference may not be called. If the site
reports launch and impact points in close agreement with
NORAD's incoming data, this confirmation gives at least a
low confidence assessment, and CINC NORAD will continue the
conferencing procedure by calling a threat assessment
conference. Nevertheless, in the analysis of the next two
sections, we use the above table as if the threat assessment
conferencing situations are the same (as described in
Chapter IY) .
B. POLICY TYPES AND DISCUSSION
Fe begin this discussion with the launc h -on-warning
case, because of its simplicity. The United States does not
currently have such a policy; however, there are many advo-
cates of launch- on- warning, since this policy improves reac-
tion time in performing a counter-strike launch.
1 . Launc h -On-Warning
Launch-on- wa rning means that upon detecting the
launch of an enemy's missiles and confirming the threat at
the site (albeit with low confidence) , we would launch some
fraction of the threatened ICBM force before those missiles
reached any of their targets.
This extremely broad definition contains several
important implications. For instance, to carry out a
launch-on-warning policy in the event of an actual enemy
missile launch, the decision makers must declare the threat
confirmed; that is, the data gathering system and the
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decision makers both must agree that the situation is a
confirmed threat situation. Then, CINC NORAD reports low
confidence in the assessment to the President. A launch-on-
warning stance presumably allows more time for the bomber
forces to escape and increases the amount of time to execute
a counter-strike. The SLBM scenario, described in Chapter
IV, makes the importance of these two features extremely
apparent.
Using the table from Section A, we can now ask the
question, "How often does a false alarm occur in the case of
a single system failure?" Recall that threat assessment
conferences were called in the situations where a false
launch indication occurred; 6 times over 6 years. Thus, the
average arrival rate is one per year (for a single detection
with lew confidence).
Adopting a launch-on-warning policy in peacetime
implies that if a single failure occurs in the system, and
the site confirms the threat, then the following sequence of
events may take place:
time of flight | 1 1 | 1 —
|
|
TO T1 T2 T3 T5 T6 T7
launch shoot!
Figure 5.2 Launch-On-Warning Time Line
Note the change to the Decision Model—the decision maker
does not wait for TU (second detection from a different
family of sensors) to occur before giving an assessment to
the President. The President also does not necessarily wait
for a second detection to give a launch order.
Thus, a lower bound for the expected waiting time
until an accidental nuclear war is 1 year, if the President
choo ses to retaliate under the conditions just described.
What makes this a lower bound is the fact that a false alarm
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must persist long enough without dual phenomenology to
convince the President to act with only a low confidence
assessment.
In any case, launch-on-warning is a high risk
policy, especially when great international tensions exist
between the United States and the USSR, as they do today.
In peacetime, a single failure without dual phenomenology
puts the President in the extremely difficult position of
deciding how long to wait before giving an order to launch a
counter- strike.
2 . Launch -Dnder - At
t
ack
The presence of dual phenomenology (the confirmation
of a launch by two families of sensors) gives much more
reliability to a confirmed threat. In previous chapters, we
demonstrated how much the decision makers rely on dual
phenomenology to reduce the chance of an incorrect response.
We now discuss how much better the warning system actually
becomes.
Currently, the United States has a launch-under-
attack policy. In this thesis, launch-under-att ack means
launching some fraction of the threatened ICBM force when
the early warning system confirms a threat and that threat
is assessed with high confidence. Again, the data gathering
system and the decision makers must agree in their assess-
ment that the threat is confirmed, as in launch-on-warning.
The conditions of dual phenomenology and a predicted impact
point in friendly territory define the confirmed threat.
The difference in this policy arises from CINC NORAD f s
assessment to the President: here, CINC NORAD reports high
confidence in what the sensors reveal, since dual phenome-
nology is required. The President is still the responsible
authority for the initiation of the launch: whether it is
one missile or many missiles, the decision to implement a
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launch-under-attack rests with the President. An advantage
to this policy is that a launch-under-attack lessens the
probability of accidental nuclear war while maintaining a
strong deterrence.
If the Onited States continues to follow a launch-
under-attack policy, what sequence of events must occur to
cause an accidental nuclear war? Since under launch-under-
attack, the United States would not launch a retaliatory
strike if only one system failed, a necessary condition for
accidental nuclear war, in this case, is for two different
false alarms on two different sensors to occur. Plus, the
false alarm on one system must overlap the false alarm on
the other system. Moreover, the two systems must agree
approximately on the launch and impact points, so that the
decision maker sees the same launch phenomenon on two sepa-
rate systems. Ihe overlap time must also be of sufficient
duration to allow enough time to launch a counter-strike.
In Chapter IV, we assumed three minutes (initially) to carry












Figure 5.3 The Interval Overlap
The minimum overlap time, then, is defined as the intersec-
tion of two false alarm intervals for at least 3 minutes.
In Figure 5.3 above, we assume that the time intervals are
stochastically independent, and so are the false alarms in
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the two systems. If we assume that the arrival process of
the false alarms is a Poisson process, the intervals between
arrivals are exponentially distributed.
In order to calculate an upper bound foe the prob-
ability of a double false alarm using dual phenomenology (a
double false alarm on two different systems) , we assume the
following:
1. We disregard the difference between the false alarms
on the two different systems (assumed above).
2. The combined rate of the radar false alarms and
infrared false alarms is one false alarm per year.
3. The time between arrivals of the combined false alarms
is exponentially distributed.
If all these false alarms involve ICBM launches
only, what is the probability that two successive false
alarms occur within 27 minutes of each other (i. e., a 3
minute overlap) ? Let
X = the time between false alarms
then
P(X < k minutes) = 1-e"
= 1 " {1 (-Xk) (-Xk) 2 /2! + . . .}
where X is one per year (that is, the mean time to wait for
a false alarm is 6/6, or one year). Dropping all but the
first three terms gives
P (X < k minutes) •* Xk
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in minutes. Note that the units for X and k must conform.
Since we assumed that it takes at least 3 minutes to execute
a counter-strike launch, at least a 3 minute overlap is
necessary. This is the "worst case" situation.
The upper bound (worst case) for an ICBH scenario is
in the situation where a 3 minute overlap occurs. Here, the
calculation gives
P (X < 27 minutes) = 27/ (365 ) (24) (60)
= 0.000051
Therefore, a lower bound for the expected waiting time of
this event is 1/0.000051 which is approximately 19,467
years. These calculations are very restrictive since we
have assumed a combined false alarm rate. This assumption
means that two sensors could fail in the same family. Prom
what we have described, we must have false alarms from two
families of sensors. This makes the probability even lower
than 0.000051 and the expected waiting time greater than
19,467 years.
The upper bound for an SLBN scenario is for a 3
minute overlap to occur:
P(second false alarm occurs < 9 minutes) = 9/(365) (24) (60)
= 0.000017
In this case, the expected waiting time to a double false
alarm is approximately 58,400 years. The upper and lower
bounds of the ICBM scenario cover this and all other
situations.
In conclusion, the United States will probably never
accidentally launch a retaliatory strike with a launch-
unier-attack policy, if the false alarm rate remains the
same as in Table II. The graph in Figure 5.4 shows how the
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expected waiting time varies with different lambdas.
However, Adding sabotage and nuclear proliferation raises
the probability and decreases the expected waiting time.
Nevertheless, with these probabilities as upper bounds, a
decision maker will pause and take time to analyze false
















a LAMBDA - NUUKX Of FALSE ALARMS PCT *tAR
Figure 5.4 Expected Waiting Time Versus Lambda
These same calculations assist the decision maker in
determining whether an alarm is real or false by adding the
conferencing procedure. If the decision maker decides the
first alarm is false, then when a second alarm occurs, it
merely supports the fact that a system failure has occurred.
Also, including the conferencing procedure may add more time
to the process, allowing for the possibility of the alarm
being confirmed by dual phenomenology, or evaluated as no
threat.
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This addition of time to the decision-making process
could be a blessing in disguise. If the system gives a 10
minute impact time, but the decision-making process already
has taken 15 minutes, then probably no launch has occurred.
Thus, if no impact materializes by the 10 minute limit, and
the decision makers still have not reached a decision, the
conferencing procedure, again, will probably stop.
C. SDHHAEI
Sophisticated systems to warn of nuclear attack are
necessary for the protection of the United States. Also, if
the Soviets know that the United States has an effective
warning system, they are less likely to initiate an attack.
Since both the United States and the USSR possess effective
warning systems, both sides have less incentive to launch an
attack, and the world is more stable as a result.
The Missile Attack Warning System is designed to make
sure that the decision to go to war is not driven by a flock
of geese or a defective computer chip. A human is always in
the decision loop.
Although the launch-on-warning policy would improve
reaction time in performing a counter-strike launch, it
seriously impairs rational decision making in a time of
extreme stress. A launch-on-warning policy puts the
President in the "hot" seat nearly once per year. But such
a burden, even once every 4- year term, would be enough for
any President. The risk of accidental nuclear war under
launch-on-warning is great enough to make this policy very
unattractive.
Launch-under-attack, on the other hand, is much safer,
given its requirement for dual phenomenology. The condi-
tions necessary for a double false alarm (a false alarm in
two separate systems) to occur in a time overlap of at least
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3 minutes make the probability of accidental nuclear war
extremely small. The President must still undergo immense





ADCOM Aerospace Defense Command
ANMCC alternate National Military Command Center
BMEWS Ballistic Missile Early Warning System
CINC NORAD Commander-in-Chief, North American
Aerospace Defense Command
CINC SAC Commander-in-Chief, Strategic Air Command
DEW Distant Early Warning Line
EMP Electromagnetic Pulse
ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
MIRV Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry
Vehicle
NCA National Command Authority
NCMC North American Aerospace Defense Command
Cheyenne Mountain Complex
NMCC National Military Command Center
NORAD North American Aerospace Defense Command
PARCS Perimeter Acquisition Radar Attack
Characterization System
SAC Strategic Air Command
SEWS Satellite Early Warning System
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SLBM Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
SOSUS Sound Surveillance System
SPASUR dnited States Navy Space Surveillance Network
SRF (Soviet) Strategic Rocket Forces
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